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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 
 




CAPRICE L. ROBERTS* 
This Article is about unjust enrichment.  It includes a theory of an unjust 
enrichment cause of action against executive actors who receive unlawful 
emoluments.  Interpretations of the boundaries of unlawful emoluments range 
from receipt of a gift or benefit because of the position of power held to quid 
pro quo exchanges of a thing of value in exchange for government information 
or advantage.  Wherever the proper line, the purpose of the law of unjust 
enrichment is to prevent and undo benefits one has no right to retain.  It 
achieves those goals with the use of restitution remedies including 
disgorgement of unjust profits. 
Unjust enrichment is particularly suited to remedy wrongful emoluments 
because the goal is to undo improper gain rather than compensate for any 
plaintiff losses.  Unjust enrichment law and restitution-based remedies law are 
experiencing a revival in the United States.  This resurgence of interest in and 
use of unjust enrichment theory has led to increased application of 
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restitutionary remedies.  This Article proposes the restitutionary-based remedy 
of disgorgement of emoluments that constitute unjust gains.  This cause of 
action and remedy already lie in American common law.  Unjust enrichment 
provides a freestanding basis for disgorgement relief as well as restitution 
remedies to protect against fiduciary breaches and violations of other protected 
interests.  Article III standing and other jurisdictional obstacles may pose a 
need for a cleaner, additional path. No existing statutes cover this field.  Thus, 
I propose a statutory solution that operationalizes restitutionary disgorgement 
as the preferred remedy to undo unjust emoluments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
disgorge: Yield or give up (funds, especially when dishonestly 
acquired) “they were made to disgorge all the profits made 
from the record”1 
One of the basic tenets of good government is that public officials act on 
behalf of the public interest rather than to enrich themselves at the public’s 
expense.  No doubt since the founding of America, government officials have 
engaged in behavior that risks violation of constitutional, statutory, and ethical 
prohibitions against certain emoluments.  Issues of conflicts of interest, 
improper gains, and recusal are not unique to modern times.  Historically, such 
matters have generated public criticism, advisory opinions by the Office of 
Legal Counsel, administrative corrective actions, statutory amendments, 
enhanced regulations, and sometimes governmental censures.  These forces 
include separation-of-powers tension that may help, along with accountability 
to voters, lead to a satisfactory resolution of the arguably problematic conduct. 
Government actors and challengers have sought regulatory and ethical 
clarification of what constitutes an unlawful emolument, but this subject has 
never been litigated until now.2  
The sitting President of the United States maintains financial interests in 
companies with hotels bearing his last name.  One such hotel is in Washington, 
D.C., not far from the White House.  The President continues to receive profits 
from that hotel, which allegedly welcomes foreign diplomats as guests.  These 
profits are emoluments as most broadly defined: any gain, benefit, advantage, 
or profit.3  Such profits, however, may or may not be unconstitutional or 
otherwise unlawful.  The Justice Department maintains that such profits are not 
unlawful as there is no proof that the President has done anything in exchange 
for such profits.4  Government officials of prior administrations—Democratic 
and Republican—have engaged in behavior raising ethical questions that 
 
1. Disgorge, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (OUP), 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/disgorge [https://perma.cc/7L5T-KSGW] (“Origin Late 15th 
century: from Old French desgorger, from des- (expressing removal) + gorge ‘throat.’”). 
2. “Until now, the issue of what constitutes an illegal emolument has never been litigated.”  
Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Questions Defense of President’s Hotel Profits, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2018, 
at A18. 
3. See infra Section II.A. 
4. The Justice Department maintains a narrow interpretation of emoluments limited to payment 
for labor and further argues that something must be given in exchange for the payment evidencing a 
corrupt intent.  See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 
3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM), ECF No. 21-1. 
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sometimes also triggered emoluments concerns, if not, violations.5  None of the 
prior allegations, however, rose to litigation over whether certain emoluments 
were in fact unlawful.  Several lawsuits filed against President Trump seek to 
prove that receipt of such profits—regardless of any lack of quid pro quo—are 
unlawful emoluments warranting relief.6 
Such emoluments controversies fill the news.7  Whether emoluments are 
improper as alleged is hotly debated among scholars and pundits.8  Scholarship 
 
5. Id. at 41–49.  At the June 2018 hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the 
emoluments suits, the Department of Justice emphasized that the prior administration’s commerce 
secretary kept stock in Hyatt Hotels Corporation, while foreign governments rented rooms worldwide.  
LaFraniere, supra note 2.  Penny Pritzker was the Secretary of Commerce in President Obama’s 
administration from 2013 to 2017; when nominated, Penny held a vast array of stocks and served as a 
board member of Hyatt Hotels among other boards.  Angel Au-Yeung, Former Secretary of Commerce 
and Hyatt Hotels Heir Penny Pritzker Identified in Paradise Papers, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/angelauyeung/2017/11/05/former-secretary-of-commerce-and-hyatt-
hotels-heir-penny-pritzker-identified-in-paradise-papers/#1ee851212618 [https://perma.cc/729Q-
PWDL].  She drafted a letter detailing her plans to divest ownership of 221 holdings and resign from 
several boards including Hyatt Hotels in order “to avoid an actual or apparent conflict of interest in the 
event that [she is] confirmed for the position of Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce.”  Letter 
from Penny Pritzker to Barbara Fredericks, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Admin., U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce (May 8, 2013), 
https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/Presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/56D8501C3C6375D285257FC20010E4A7/%
24FILE/Penny-S-Pritzker-EA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WTH-2UZC]; see Au-Yeung, supra.  
Government documents show former Secretary Pritzker claimed simply that she had sold certain 
holdings; an international group of investigative journalists claim that leaked records, known as the 
Paradise Papers, reveal a more complex picture regarding the path of divestment—a transfer of those 
holdings to an LLC that may have been owned by trusts for Pritzker’s children.  Au-Yeung, supra.  
Pritzker’s spokesperson maintains that Pritzker consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and 
complied with all government requirements regarding her divestitures and holdings.  Id. 
6. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 877 (D. Md. 2018); Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).   
7. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Jonathan O’Connell, Trump’s Hotel Profits at Center of 
Emoluments Clause Hearing, WASH. POST, June 12, 2018 at B4; Jonathan Stempel, Trump’s Lawyers 
Say Trump SoHo Exit Undermines Emoluments Lawsuit, REUTERS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lawsuit-emoluments/trumps-lawyers-say-trump-soho-
exit-undermines-emoluments-lawsuit-idUSKBN1DO2FK [https://perma.cc/98WS-32ZY]; Ann 
Telnaes, Emoluments, Schmoluments, WASH. POST, (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/05/16/emoluments-schmoluments/ 
[https://perma.cc/SU5N-H7FZ]. 
8. See, e.g., Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman and the Judicial Education Project as Amici 
Curiae In Support of the Defendant, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 2d 725 (D. Md. 2018) 
(No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM) (arguing the Foreign Emoluments does not apply to elected positions such 
as the presidency); Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” 
Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759 (2017) (disproving broad interpretations of constitutional 
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continues to mount on the meaning of constitutional emoluments and modern 
applications to alleged violations.9  These debates leave a gap in the literature 
with respect to addressing the remedies question.  The relevant constitutional 
provisions state no remedies.  Assume constitutional emoluments violations 
exist, what are we going to do about it?  This Article offers answers to that core 
question and pathways to achieve desired goals of the underlying laws. 
Putting aside the precise boundary on the impropriety of certain 
emoluments, what is the proper remedy?  Which remedy will achieve the 
primary aims of the governing laws?  This inquiry is vital for accountability of 
this and future administrations.  If our laws—especially constitutional ones—
lack bite, the temptation to engage in improper conduct, downplay arguable 
conflicts, and cover up questionable behavior will rise.  Where unjust 
emoluments are proven, this Article explains why restitutionary disgorgement 
is a well-suited remedy to serve the goals of unjust enrichment and anti-
corruption laws. 
This Article introduces the constitutional boundaries for emoluments and 
the Framers’ goals.  Next, it summarizes the pending emoluments cases—all of 
which fail to allege an unjust enrichment claim or remedy.  In Part III, it situates 
the disgorgement remedy within restitution law.  This Article address 
challenges, but ultimately promotes restitutionary disgorgement as a powerful 
remedy to serve preferred goals.  Part IV operationalizes potential paths for 
pursuing the disgorgement remedy against government officials including a 
statutory solution and a common law path.  The Article concludes that 
restitutionary disgorgement is the optimal remedy to deter corruption and self-
dealing, as well as prevent unjust enrichment. 
 
emoluments); John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal 
Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (June 30, 2017), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2995693 
[https://perma.cc/XJ8R-CXAE] (refuting the administration’s narrow interpretation of emoluments 
and correcting the historical record with an exhaustive definitional review); Norman Eisen, Richard 
Painter & Laurence Tribe, The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J. 
Trump, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emoluments-clause-its-
text-meaning-and-application-to-donald-j-trump/ [https://perma.cc/4E37-9D2N]. 
9. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2018) (“The faithfulness of a President to the Constitution, 
the laws, and the ideals and traditions of the United States is at issue as never before . . . .  Does the 
Constitution have a plan for when it appears that a President may be motivated not by a view of the 
public good but by self-regarding or bad faith purposes?”). 
 
ROBERTS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2019  5:57 PM 




A. Emoluments under the United States Constitution 
What are emoluments?  The English definition is “[a] salary, fee, or profit 
from employment or office.”10  The French word “émolument” means benefit 
or revenue.11  The Latin word “emolumentum” means advantage, benefit, gain, 
or profit.12  A much more narrow interpretation is only profit from 
employment.13  Sources contemporary with the Framers’ environment and then 
public understanding14 provide support for broader interpretations such as any 
gain.15  Regardless of the ultimate interpretative winner (scholarly or litigative) 
 
10. Emolument, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/emolument [https://perma.cc/YK5D-YLNJ] (last visited Oct. 7, 
2019). 
11. Emolument, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/emolument [https://perma.cc/GM3V-CU8A] (last visited Oct. 7, 
2019) (explaining partial roots of the term emolument derive “from Old French émolument ‘advantage, 
gain, benefit; income, revenue’” in the 13th century). 
12. Emolumentum, THE OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2012). 
13. In pending litigation discussed infra Section II.C, President Trump has argued that 
emolument means only “profit from labor.”  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35, District of Columbia 
v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8.17-cv-1596-PJM), ECF No. 21-1.  The President 
advances the noscitur a sociis rule of construction for interpreting terms in written documents by 
gleaning “meaning naturally attaching to them from their context.”  District of Columbia v. Trump, 
315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886–87, n.21 (D. Md. 2018) (citations omitted).  In addition to the context, the 
President relies on more narrow definitional examples defining emolument as profit from employ: 
“profit, what is gained by labour,” “profit from an office or position,” “payment to a miller for grinding 
corn.”  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35 n.28, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 
(D. Md. 2018), ECF No. 21-1 (citing Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English 
Language 189 (1888), and The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 326 (1988)). 
14. For advancement of a public-meaning conception of originalism for constitutional 
interpretation, see for example Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of 
Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–41 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller, eds. 2011), and 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Account of Constitutional 
Interpretation (Apr. 9, 2018) (“The Public Meaning Thesis is the claim that the original meaning of 
the constitutional text is its public meaning: roughly, the meaning that the text had for competent 
speakers of American English at the time each provision of the text was framed and ratified.”) (on file 
with author). 
15. To examine a helpful collection of historical resources on the Framers’ views on emoluments 
and related goals tied to both Emoluments Clauses, explore 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 379–90 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987).  This same collection is also available online: The 
Founders Constitution, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/vol-3-the-
constitution-part-2 [https://perma.cc/X34A-VDUV] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).  Pending emoluments 
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on the precise constitutional meaning of emoluments, this Article assumes that 
certain emoluments may be lawful while others unlawful.  In order for an 
emolument to constitute an unjust benefit and warrant a disgorgement remedy, 
receipt of a particular emolument must be improper under emoluments 
prohibitions or other law.16 
The United States Constitution prohibits federal government officials from 
receiving emoluments from foreign states without congressional consent: 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And 
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, 
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any 
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.17 
This constitutional provision is known as the Emoluments Clause, the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, and also as the Title of Nobility Clause.18  The 
United States Supreme Court has never interpreted the meaning of this clause.19  
The Foreign Emoluments Clause and surrounding clauses say nothing about 
what remedy might lie in the event a government official violates the clause.20 
The United States Constitution also contains a Domestic Emoluments 
Clause: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the 
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that 
Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”21  
This clause applies explicitly to the President and bars the receipt of, during 
the elected period, “any other emolument” from the United States or any state 
 
litigation, discussed infra Section II.C., have included extensive briefing from the parties and amici 
curiae on historical evidence on how to interpret the constitutional meaning of emoluments including 
definitions stemming from dictionaries, THE FEDERALIST (infra Section II.B), and well-read authors 
of the Framers’ day (infra Section II.B).  One such court detailed the key evidence and sided with 
broader conceptions such as any profit or gain over narrow definitions such as mere bribery.  District 
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“The clear weight of the evidence shows that an 
‘emolument’ was commonly understood by the founding generation to encompass any ‘profit,’ ‘gain,’ 
or ‘advantage.’”). 
16. See infra Part III.  
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
18. Legal Information Institute, Emoluments Clause, CORNELL LAW SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/emoluments_clause [https://perma.cc/5P94-DPUQ] (last updated 
June 2017). 
19. Disagreement exists about the reach of the clause, including whether it covers elected 
officials.  Also, the Articles of Confederation explicitly covered state government actors, while the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not. 
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
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within the United States.22  The Supreme Court has not interpreted the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause.23 
The Emoluments Clauses have several functions.  One is to safeguard the 
government official’s dedication and loyalty to aims of the country—to do the 
government’s business rather than one’s own private business.  A founding 
view of republican virtues included a strong bias against self-dealing,24 though 
the Founders often engaged in behavior that would violate conflicts of interest 
under modern norms.25  
Another purpose is the protection of national security.  Directly related to 
national security is the creation of constitutional boundaries that ensure against 
public corruption.26  At the country’s founding, fears existed that our 
government leaders would be susceptible to capture by foreign monarchs.27  For 
example, if the President could accept emoluments from foreign leaders, the 
 
22. Id. 
23. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 161 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (Walker, J., dissenting) (“Invoking constitutional provisions never directly litigated in the 
230‐year history of our Republic prior to the Trump presidency, the plaintiffs in this case claim that 
the President has inflicted competitive injury on their businesses by maintaining ownership over the 
Trump Organization’s high‐end hotels and restaurants and accepting the business of foreign and state 
official clientele in contravention of both the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause.”); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 373 (4th Cir. 2019) (“As the [Foreign and Domestic 
Emoluments] Clauses do not expressly confer any rights or provide any remedies, efforts to enforce 
them in courts have been virtually nonexistent prior to President Trump’s inauguration in 2017.”). 
24. See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133, 2140–41 (2017) (“Governmental self-dealing is a phenomenon 
disfavored in constitutional law and jurisprudence.  The generation that framed the Constitution, 
steeped in republican tradition, developed a strong aversion to self-dealing—that is—the act of trading 
on public prerogative for private gain.”) (citing, among others, NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE 
PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 10 (2013); and 
then citing ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX 
TO CITIZEN’S UNITED 39 (2014)); see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
25. One prominent example is Chief Justice Marshall’s authoring the opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison when he previously served as the government actor who failed to deliver the commissions at 
issue.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
26. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 447–48 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion for “disregard[ing] our 
constitutional history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society” that show the important 
governmental interest in preventing all manner of corruption not just limited to quid pro quo iterations 
because “[c]orruption can take many forms . . . operat[ing] along a spectrum” from “selling a vote” to 
“selling access” for the opportunity to influence). 
27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009). 
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Framers worried that foreign influences could buy favor, weaken the Executive, 
and threaten the national security of the United States.  Emoluments, therefore, 
should not be accepted that would create an allegiance or curry favor on behalf 
of certain states or countries over others.  The interest in protecting national 
security surpasses the more straight-forward, ethical goal of good government. 
Other laws and ethical restrictions also govern improper gains including 
using one’s public office for private gain.28  Such laws may bolster claims of 
wrongdoing as they help maintain the public trust and avoid the appearance of 
corruption.  Ethical constraints may overlap with anti-corruption concerns.  For 
now, however, the Emoluments Clauses are the primary mode of substantive 
attack in pending lawsuits against the Executive. 
The current Executive’s failure to divest ownership interests in a company 
with an international brand (among other alleged gains) has raised both Foreign 
and Domestic Emoluments controversies.29  A debate exists as to the scope and 
meaning of emoluments under both constitutional provisions.30  The vigorous 
substantive and historical debate offers two basic poles: (i) a broad 
interpretation and (ii) a narrow construction.  This Article does not resolve the 
constitutional interpretative debate.  Whatever the scope of emoluments 
 
28. See, e.g., The Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012) (prohibiting federal 
employees, including the Executive, from accepting anything beyond de minimis gifts except as 
explicitly provided); The Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012) (prohibiting gifts to 
federal employees); Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 
5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 (2010) (“An employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, for 
the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or 
persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, including nonprofit 
organizations of which the employee is an officer or member, and persons with whom the employee 
has or seeks employment or business relations.”)  Of course, such regulations provide avenues of 
institutional self-policing and sanctioning of bad actors.  It remains unclear if such provisions offer a 
viable avenue for court-based remedies.  And, if so, by whom? 
29. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018); Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).   
30. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Originalist Analysis About the Emoluments Clause from 
President-Elect Trump’s Legal Team, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/01/11/the-originalist-analysis-about-the-emoluments-clause-
from-president-elect-trumps-legal-team/ [https://perma.cc/6F3Q-SK3Q]; Josh Blackman & Seth 
Barrett Tillman, The Emoluments Clauses Litigation, Part 1: The Constitution’s Taxonomy of Officers 
and Offices, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:04 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/09/25/the-emoluments-clauses-
litigation-part-1-the-constitutions-taxonomy-of-officers-and-offices/?utm_term=.19f68d41b822 
[https://perma.cc/RHP8-VXE8]; Jed Shugerman, Is Trump Receiving “Office-Related” Emoluments?, 
SHUGERBLOG (Feb. 25, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/02/25/is-trump-receiving-office-related-
emoluments/ [https://perma.cc/Q5YD-FN5C]; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman & Gautham Rao, 
Emoluments, Zones of Interests, and Political Questions: A Cautionary Tale, 45 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 651, 652–63 (2018). 
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provisions, I argue that disgorgement is an appropriate and desirable remedy as 
a judicial or legislative matter. 
A few interpretative opinions offer insights into the possible scope of 
emoluments.  Most of the opinions establish what activities do not rise to the 
level of unlawful emoluments.31  Through the decades, the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice has issued opinions suggesting its 
interpretation of the scope of the Emoluments Clauses.  Some of these opinions 
clarify the OLC’s position that certain honors and monies do not constitute 
unlawful emoluments.32  For example, a president’s receipt of the Nobel Prize 
Award is not violative.33  Nor was another president’s receipt of state retirement 
benefits as they did not subject him to improper influence.34  The OLC has not 
publicly issued an opinion on the current emolument controversies.35  The 
current President’s failure to divest has reinvigorated the debate about the scope 
of the Emoluments Clauses and about the reach and relevance of the OLC’s 
prior opinions.36  Regardless of the resolution of the fight on the merits, 
disgorgement of gains should be on the short list of potent remedies if any 
emoluments prove unlawful.  Disgorgement will best serve the underlying 
goals. 
B. Goals of Anti-Emolument Laws 
This Article does not resolve the constitutional battle over the precise 
meaning of unlawful emoluments and whether any particular allegation fits that 
definition.  To discern ideal remedies, the goals behind anti-emolument laws 
are more important than definitive boundaries of application.  The Federalist 
Papers contain at least fifteen instances of the word emolument.  Some of the 
 
31. See infra notes 34–37. 
32. See infra notes 34–37.  
33. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the 
President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009). 
34. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the State of California, 5 
Op. O.L.C. 187 (1981). 
35. A pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeks all O.L.C. opinions interpreting 
the emoluments clause.  Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington FOIA Request to the 
Office of Legal Counsel, (Dec. 22, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage.citizensforethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/02143023/2016-12-22-FOIA-Request-OLC-Memos-Domestic-
Emoluments-Clause.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y66G-A56B].  No results are posted. 
36. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, How the DOJ Brief in CREW v. Trump Reveals that Donald 




ROBERTS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2019  5:57 PM 
2019] DISGORGING EMOLUMENTS 11 
references appear to simply acknowledge that “emoluments will flow” from 
governmental offices.37  At times, the word emolument connotes simple receipt 
of payment38 or related benefit.39  At other times, the discussion seeks to ensure 
the receipt of no “other emolument”40 or to prevent any increase in 
emoluments.41 
Framers’ discussions of emoluments were part of the overarching interest 
in rejecting England’s monarchy system.  For example, after quoting the 
proposed text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and comparing other 
constitutional provisions and lack of provisions (such as Titles of Nobility) to 
England’s foundation, Hamilton expressed the import of certain prohibitions 
such as against titles of nobility to ensure protection of America’s republican 
form of government “of the people.”42 
More specifically, the Framers had concerns about government officials 
engaging in self-dealing behavior.43  Self-dealing, in this context, arises when 
government actors use their public offices to create and achieve advantages 
furthering personal interests.44  It also includes using their government positions 
to line their own pockets.45  
Another goal of anti-emolument laws is simply that the government officers 
should have undivided loyalty to the government.46  This ideal requires 
 
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 27, at 265 (James Madison) (“From the gift 
of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.”). 
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 27, at 320 (James Madison). 
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 27, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The legislature, with 
a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as 
obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him.”). 
40. Id. (“It is there provided that ‘The President of the United States shall, at stated times, receive 
for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for 
which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument 
from the United States, or any of them.’”) (emphasis in original); id. at 421–22 (“Neither the Union, 
nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other 
emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act.”). 
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 27, at 320–21 (“The members of the Congress are 
rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be 
increased, during the term of their election.”). 
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 27, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Nothing need be 
said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility.  This may truly be denominated 
the cornerstone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious 
danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.”). 
43. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2, 22, supra note 27, at 7, 120 (Alexander Hamilton). 
44. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2, 22, supra note 27, at 7, 120 (Alexander Hamilton).  
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 27, at 47 (James Madison). 
46. See S. Rep. 95-194, at 30 (1977); Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of 
Government Employees by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994). 
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government actors to hold allegiance only to America.47  That loyalty may be 
placed in jeopardy should the government officer receive favors and benefits 
from foreign countries and their officials. 
Anti-corruption is also a key sentiment for such prohibitions: “It was 
thought proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit 
any one in office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign 
states.”48  A limit on receipt of emoluments operates to avoid one’s loyalty 
being bought or clouded.49  Related to this interest is a desire to ensure the 
government actor’s integrity remains intact and uncorrupted.50  Avoiding the 
appearance of corruption is also important to maintaining public trust. 
There are other remedial paths that could serve similar, desirable goals.  
Remedies other than disgorgement, however, may go farther than preferred.  
More importantly, they are more difficult to achieve than disgorgement.  For 
example, criminal sanctions could also serve anti-corruption and related goals, 
but criminal sanctions would also address a more serious goal: punishing 
offenders.  Even if the Framers sought to punish those who violated anti-
emolument prohibitions, criminal penalties measurably raise the stakes.  Any 
criminal culpability would require mens rea, prosecutorial interest in pursuing, 
and challenges including possible immunities.  Unjust enrichment theory 
generally requires lower levels of intentional behavior to reach unjustness.  
Restitution does not punish.  Disgorgement of improper gains is not punitive, 
though it often exceeds compensatory loss.  If one fears overapplication of 
disgorgement as a bold remedy, Congress could tailor the intent to be higher.  
Similarly, criminal law would default to a higher burden of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt) than restitution law’s default of preponderance.  Again, 
though, if a restitution-based theory becomes statutory, the legislature could 
adjust the required proof level to a clear and convincing standard or higher. 
Another alternative remedial device is impeachment.  Of course, the 
requirements are constitutional and extremely high.  Political momentum and 
 
47. See S. Rep. 95-194, at 30 (1977) (The committee approved a series of more stringent rules 
and procedures relating to the receipt of gifts, which demonstrates that the committee’s consciousness 
of American loyalty and disapproval of the receipt of foreign gifts). 
48. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale 
University Press 1911) (statement of Governor Edmond Jennings Randolph). 
49. Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees by Foreign 
Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994) (“Those who hold offices under the United States 
must give the government their unclouded judgment and their uncompromised loyalty.  That judgment 
might be biased, and that loyalty divided, if they received financial benefits from a foreign 
government.”). 
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 27, at 421 (ensuring that a president’s integrity not be 
weakened or corrupted by “appealing to his avarice”). 
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proof would be paramount.  Unlawful emoluments in some iterations could 
include behavior that amounts to an impeachable offense, but daylight remains 
for a range of emoluments that could be improper yet do not amount to 
impeachable conduct.  The House of Representatives would have to choose to 
include in its impeachment inquiry possible emoluments violations.  If the 
House did so, and then the Senate later found that any such violations amounted 
to an impeachable offense such as bribery, the consequence would be removal 
from office.  Still, such an inquiry could also lead to an interest in recovering 
any ill-gotten gains on behalf of the United States government.  Certain 
potential emoluments may be unlawful, but not rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses.  Accordingly, it is important to have effective civil remedies, 
including restitutionary disgorgement, to help enforce emoluments 
prohibitions. 
C. Pending Emoluments Litigation 
Several emoluments-based lawsuits are pending against the President.  
Each of the suits faces jurisdictional obstacles such as standing challenges; so 
far, a couple have survived initial challenges and will advance to discovery.  On 
relief sought, the various emoluments complaints do not include unjust 
enrichment or restitution as a claim or a remedy.51 
1. The District of Columbia and Maryland  
In one of the suits, the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia filed 
a lawsuit claiming that President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause by accepting gifts and benefits from foreign entities seeking to curry 
favor with the then-new administration.52  The plaintiffs also allege that foreign 
leaders are more likely to stay at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C., and 
that the affiliation with President Trump gives the hotel an unfair advantage 
over other hotels who lose the business.53 
 
51. Emoluments litigation should explicitly include unjust enrichment and restitution remedies.  
Should courts vindicate plaintiffs’ claims as pleaded, however, restitutionary goals may be achieved 
based on general prayers for equitable relief because an injunction could be framed to order divestment.  
Again, though, the strategic advantage of pleading restitution is that it takes the focus away from 
plaintiff’s proof of loss to defendant’s wrongful gain.  A restitution and unjust enrichment count would 
also broaden the emoluments inquiry to include fiduciary breaches and other wrongs. 
52. Complaint at 41–42, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 
8:17-cv-1596-PJM). 
53. Id. at 40–42. 
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The complaint fails to include any restitutionary theory or remedy.  
Plaintiffs’ complaint requests declaratory, injunctive, and other relief as the 
court deems just and proper.54 
Despite serious challenges, the Maryland-District of Columbia suit 
survived a motion to dismiss.55  The court ruled that plaintiffs stated actionable 
claims upon which relief could be granted.56  Specifically, the court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs established a proprietary harm satisfying “competitive 
standing” by alleging that the purported wrongful transactions will “almost 
surely” result in plaintiffs losing business.57  The court also articulated two 
alternative theories supporting standing: parens patria (standing to protect the 
economic interests of a state or district’s citizens) and quasi-sovereign interests 
(competitive favoritism that disrupts the federal-state balance of power).58  On 
other issues including individual immunity, the court deferred ruling.59  Based 
upon more persuasive evidence on interpretations of emoluments, the court 
determined that plaintiffs alleged viable constitutional violations against the 
President in his official capacity under both emolument clauses.60  The court 
denied the President’s motion to certify questions for appeal, and instead it 
directed the parties to propose a schedule for civil discovery.61 
The President in his official capacity then filed a writ of mandamus and 
sought a stay.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
granted the stay pending consideration of the writ, granted oral argument with 
two questions in addition to the procedural issues raised by the mandamus 
request,62 and ultimately ruled in the President’s favor on the writ of 
mandamus.63  The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
focusing on the lack of causation and redressability elements of constitutional 
standing.64  Further, the court quickly rejected the alternative bases for standing 
 
54. Id. at 44. 
55. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 757 (D. Md. 2018). 
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 744–45, 747. 
58. Id. at 736–38. 
59. Id. at 733 n.4. 
60. Id. at 747, 757. 
61. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 844 (D. Md. 2018) (denying 
interlocutory appeal and request for stay and requesting discovery schedule). 
62. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2019).  Questions for oral argument included 
whether either emoluments clause supports plaintiffs’ cause of action for injunctive relief and whether 
plaintiffs allege a cognizable injury to satisfy constitutional standing requirements.  Id. 
63. Id. at 380. 
64. Id. at 376. 
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and noted that the suit amounted to no more than a constitutionally prohibited 
generalized grievance.65  Maryland and the District of Columbia petitioned for 
rehearing.66  The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing en banc.67 
The two underlying opinions disagree completely on all facets of standing 
analysis.  Standing remains in dispute for each of the pending suits until, and 
if, the Supreme Court decides to clarify what constitutes cognizable injury for 
emoluments.  Whether one sides with the lower or appellate court’s analysis on 
the standing threshold, this is the moment to lay the foundation for a thoughtful 
remedial approach for emoluments violations of the future. 
2. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
Another is a lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington (CREW).68  CREW alleges that President Trump’s businesses have 
benefitted from him becoming president.69  For example, plaintiffs claim the 
Trump Hotel in Washington D.C. is leased from the General Services 
Administration, and membership fees at President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Resort 
in Florida doubled from $100,000 to $200,000 after his election.70 
The CREW litigation is more detailed in its prayer for relief, but it asks for 
the same basic categories of remedies: declaratory, injunction, and other proper 
relief.71  Again, it does not include an unjust enrichment claim or restitution-
based remedy. 
A federal district judge in the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
CREW litigation.72  The court reasoned that the action was not ripe for 
adjudication.73  According to the judge, plaintiffs’ suit raises concern about a 
conflict between two co-equal branches of government: Congress and the 
 
65. Id. at 379. 
66. Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 16–22, In re Trump, 2019 WL 5212216 
(4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019) (No. 18-2486) (criticizing the court’s use of mandamus jurisdiction and arguing 
that the court reconsider its ruling against quasi-sovereign standing and competitor standing, especially 
in light of the Second Circuit’s ruling in favor of standing in an analogous matter). 
67. District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 18-2488, 2019 WL 5212218 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019) 
(order granting petition for rehearing en banc). 
68. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. 
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 3, 34. 
71. Id. at 64–65. 
72. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188, 
195 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (ruling that plaintiffs’ “alleged competitive injury” did not fall “within the zone 
of interests that the Emoluments Clauses sought to protect” and therefore lacked constitutional standing 
to proceed). 
73. Id. at 195. 
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President.74  As a matter of judicial restraint, the court reasoned that it “should 
not interfere unless and until Congress has asserted its authority and taken some 
sort of action with respect to [the President’s] alleged constitutional violations 
of its consent power.”75  CREW’s appeal to the Second Circuit primarily argues 
that plaintiffs satisfy Article III standing and overcome prudential barriers.76  
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, resuscitated the CREW litigation.77  
The court found that plaintiffs satisfied standing requirements by alleging 
sufficient injury including the competitive injury from lost patronage caused by 
the President’s unfair advantage over the same customer base.78  This reasoning 
creates a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling against standing in the 
Maryland-District of Columbia litigation.79  Whether the Second Circuit’s 
favorable standing determination remains intact will be up to the Supreme 
Court should the Court opt to consider resolving the justiciability issues in the 
emoluments context once the cases are ripe.80 
3. Democratic Legislators 
A third lawsuit includes 201 Democratic legislators who assert that the 
Constitution mandates that Congress should have been consulted on whether 
the President may accept foreign payments to his company, the Trump 
Organization.81  The primary allegation in the complaint is that the President 
accepted emoluments without first obtaining congressional assent.82 
As to remedies sought, again no restitution.  The Democratic legislators’ 
suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the catchall for further 
relief as the court deems just.83  
 
74. Id. at 194. 
75. Id. at 194–95.  “Congress is not a potted plant.  It is a co-equal branch of the federal 
government with the power to act as a body in response to Defendant’s alleged Foreign Emoluments 
Clause violations, if it chooses to do so.”  Id. at 195 n.8.  
76. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. 
Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-474). 
77. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 939 F.3d at 131. 
78. Id. at 143–44. 
79. See id. at *9 (noting the creation of a circuit split); supra Section II.C.1. 
80. See Andy Grewal, The Second Circuit’s Botched “Zone of Interests” Analysis in CREW v. 
Trump, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 14, 2019), https://yalejreg.com/nc/the-
second-circuits-botched-zone-of-interests-analysis-in-crew-v-trump/ [https://perma.cc/3NH7-7B4K]. 
81. Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2018). 
82. Id. at 50. 
83. Complaint at 53–54, Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (1:17-cv-01154-EGS). 
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Much like the CREW litigation, the Democratic lawmakers’ Foreign 
Emoluments suit faced formidable standing problems.84  The legislators, 
however, survived the standing challenge for now.85  The court limited its ruling 
to only the standing threshold.86  The legislators alleged the President violated 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause by accepting “prohibited foreign emoluments 
without seeking the consent of Congress.”87  Plaintiffs maintained that each 
plaintiff suffered a concrete, particularized injury.  United States District Court 
Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that 201 minority legislators (Senators and 
Representatives) demonstrated sufficient injury to satisfy Article III standing 
requirements.88  The judge reasoned that the legislators alleged concrete injuries 
sufficient to satisfy standing.89 
According to the court, Plaintiffs satisfied the standing hurdle by alleging 
denial of a voting opportunity that constituted a cognizable actual injury caused 
by defendant and redressable by a favorable court opinion notwithstanding 
separation-of-powers constraints.90  The court justified its standing holding 
despite the separation-of-powers tension on the basis that “plaintiffs have no 
adequate legislative remedy,” but instead the matter is resolvable in the courts.91 
The court’s opinion greatly relied on amici briefs to support a broad 
interpretation of emoluments as a powerful guard against corruption and 
foreign influence.92  Per the amici’s evidence, the court noted that presidents 
historically have sought OLC advice before accepting possible emoluments.93  
Further, because the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause explicitly 
prohibits presidential acceptance of unlawful foreign emoluments, “the 
Constitution gives each individual Member of Congress a right to vote before 
 
84. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. at 52–57 (relying heavily on Court’s standing analysis in Raines 
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)).  In Raines, individual members of Congress were found to lack standing 
because they did not have “sufficient personal stake in [the] dispute and [did] not allege[] a sufficiently 
concrete injury” because the members of Congress “alleged no injury to themselves as individuals . . . , 
the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . , and their attempt to 
litigate this dispute at this time is contrary to historical experience.”  Id. at 57 (quoting Raines, 521 
U.S. at 829–30). 
85. Id. at 72.  
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 50. 
88. Id. at 49–50, 72.  Specifically, plaintiffs argue that they suffer particularized injury “when 
his or her vote is nullified by the President’s denial of the opportunity to vote on the record about 
whether to approve his acceptance of a prohibited foreign emolument.”  Id. at 50. 
89. Id. at 50–51, 64–65. 
90. Id. at 54, 64–65. 
91. Id. at 54–55. 
92. Id. at 51 n.2 (“The Court appreciates the illuminating analysis provided by the amici.”). 
93. Id. at 53–54. 
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the President accepts.”94  All of this set the backdrop for the court to find that 
plaintiffs possessed standing under Article III to protect against foreign 
corruption of the Executive. 
With the legislators surviving the initial standing threshold, discovery 
ordinarily would commence.  As with all the pending suits, however, the 
government is advancing substantial arguments for stays pending an expedited 
appeal.  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
remanded the matter back to the district court for consideration of unexplored 
separation-of-powers issues.95  Given the directive, Judge Sullivan put a hold 
on thirty-seven subpoenas previously issued to obtain the President’s financial 
and business records.  Judge Sullivan has requested new briefing from both 
parties.  The Department of Justice persists in its efforts seeking the federal 
appellate court reverse the favorable standing ruling.  
The Democratic legislators’ case poses the strongest case for standing, yet 
it is not without critique given the novelty and magnitude of the allegations as 
well as the political stage.  Again, regardless of the standing fight, it is an ideal 
time to consider both the scope of unlawful emoluments and the proper remedy 
for future emoluments violations by any administration. 
D. Restitution Road 
Restitution should be a part of litigation strategy and any regulatory reform 
for emoluments violations.  For the pending litigation that has so far survived, 
the standing rulings remain subject to appeal.  Formidable challenges on appeal 
include ripeness and separation-of-powers concerns.  The standing rulings 
remain vulnerable because much hinges on the interpretation of emoluments 
and the cognizability of injuries as alleged.  Also, the remedies sought may pose 
roadblocks during the course of litigation.  For example, even assuming 
standing, serious issues may arise regarding whether plaintiffs can satisfy 
equitable requirements for the remedies sought.96  These remedies will 
encounter other challenges.  For example, the President argues that the 
 
94. Id. at 54. 
95. In re Trump, 2019 WL 3285234, *2 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 2019) (No. 19-5198) (order of 
remand) (“The district court did not adequately address whether—given the separation of powers issues 
present in a lawsuit brought by members of the Legislative Branch against the President of the United 
States—resolving the legal questions and/or postponing discovery would be preferable, or whether 
discovery is even necessary (or more limited discovery would suffice) to establish whether there is an 
entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief of the type sought by plaintiffs.”). 
96. Equitable requirements include formidable proof obstacles such as proving legal remedies 
are inadequate. 
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injunctive remedy sought by the 201 legislators is unconstitutional.97  Assuming 
injunctive relief is constitutional, such an in personam order is intrusive by 
nature and poses separation-of-powers concerns that restitution awards do not. 
Restitution-based remedies also avoid challenges rooted in a plaintiff’s 
inability to demonstrate compensatory loss as well as other classic hurdles.98  
Again, restitution remedies including disgorgement are gain-based.  The 
remedy looks to what defendant has gained unjustly.  For this simple reason, 
restitution is an advantageous alternative frame for plaintiffs attempting to 
show cognizable injury.  Still, constitutional standing requires more than a 
generalized grievance—citizens cannot simply claim a government official has 
violated a statute or constitutional provision.99  Under a restitutionary theory, 
plaintiff would need to show a causal link to the government actor’s wrongful 
gain or otherwise satisfy the constitutional minimum of standing as a statutorily 
created whistleblower status with sufficient nexus to the harm.   
 
III. THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY 
A. Disgorgement Remedy Shaping Rights 
Determining who has a right matters less than how we choose to protect 
that right to serve our desired goals.100  Substantive rights shape remedies, and 
remedies in turn shape rights.101  The latter is especially true when there are 
 
97. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50 n.1. 
98. See, e.g., Wright v. Genessee County, No. 156579, 2019 WL 3242418 (Mich. July 18, 2019) 
(ruling that unjust enrichment for which one seeks restitution rather than compensatory damages is an 
freestanding cause of action—independent of tort and contract—and overcomes governmental tort 
immunity). 
99. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992); see also F. Andrew Hessick, 
Quasi-Sovereign Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1926, 1927–28 (2019) (exploring state versus 
individual standing and noting the state’s interest in defending the public interest).  For a call to 
reconsider Lujan’s reasoning based on the underexamined Anglo-American legal history of qui tam 
legislation that authorized private informers to monitor and collect litigation bounties for unlawful acts 
of executive officials, see Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: 
Constitutional Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (2018). 
100. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 859 (1999) (“[D]eciding who has a right (or, in Cathedral terms, an ‘entitlement’) is often less 
important than deciding how that right should be protected in order to best facilitate efficient 
transfers.”). 
101. My body of work and planned manuscript echo and further articulate this theme.  See id. at 
858 (advancing a public law correlation—inextricable intertwinement—between remedy and right); 
see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (theorizing a correlation between private 
law rights and remedies); John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, 
and Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849 (2015) (explaining the historical relationship between federal 
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intersections or gaps in the law.  Remedies like disgorgement—stripping 
defendant’s wrongful profits—help serve previously unmet or underserviced 
goals of the law.  Of course, a remedy should not flow where no right exists.  
There must be a sufficient foundation and a need for the remedy to reach the 
offensive conduct that will otherwise go undeterred. 
A modern example in American law is opportunistic breaches of 
contract.102  Conventional breach of contract remedies, such as expectancy and 
reliance damages, did not capture the wrongfulness.  Restitution concepts 
enable a plaintiff, in rare cases of proven opportunism, to strip defendant’s 
wrongful gain.  Aside from specific performance, conventional contract law 
monetary remedies serve only a compensation function.  For rare breaches that 
are opportunistic, compensation does not suffice.  The law of unjust enrichment 
stepped in to fill the gap between contract and tort law103 by disgorging 
defendant’s unjust gain from a deliberate, profitable breach in which defendant 
took conscious advantage of plaintiff’s insufficient ability to achieve substitute 
performance.  American cases underlying the remedy did not use proper 
labels104 but achieved the same result on grounds captured by the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.105 
1. Historical Roots and Development of the Disgorgement Remedy 
Disgorgement of improper gains is a remedy much broader and more 
storied than an opportunistic breach of contract claim.  It seeks to undo unjust 
gain and deter wrongfulness.  Restitutionary-based disgorgement serves as a 
remedy across a host of underlying causes of action from common law 
 
cause of action and rights, remedies, and jurisdiction, and finding closeness only to remedies).  But see 
Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986) 
(lamenting the conflation between private rights and remedies).  
102. I have written much in this area.  See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement 
as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, A 
Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 945 (2008); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach 
of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131 (2008). 
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d. (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (operationalizing disgorgement as the remedy for opportunistic breaches of contract). 
104. Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977) (stripping defendant’s 
profits in breach of contract action, though not using the label disgorgement); see also Snepp v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (imposing a constructive trust on book royalties where defendant 
failed to obtain prepublication clearance).  
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, pt. II, ch. 4, 
introductory note & reporter’s note a. 
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examples like breach of fiduciary duty106 to statutory examples like federal 
securities law violations.107  It has historical roots in equity.108  But, it is a 
mistake to assume disgorgement is always equitable because of its historical 
ties.  Specifically, it is tied to the equitable remedy of accounting for profits109 
through which the Chancellor110 would order defendant to deliver accounting 
books to an equitable master to unearth sources of potential wrongful profits.111  
The Chancellor no longer operates in this realm;112 instead a judge uses 
discretion to permit and shape an equitable accounting.  The modern 
disgorgement remedy may stem from a common law or statutory claim and may 
not have any identifiable association with an equitable accounting.  Again, 
 
106. See Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
449, 449 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) [hereinafter Bray, Fiduciary 
Remedies] (analyzing fiduciary law remedies including accounting for profits, disgorgement, and 
constructive trusts to discern if a distinct body of law emerges based on the remedial goals sought); 
see also Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for 
Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (exploring historical support for 
fiduciary constitutionalism and advancing remedies for public fiducial breaches).   
107. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017) (explaining that courts have ordered 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions since the 1970’s upon the SEC’s requests for the grant of 
disgorgement as part of the court’s “inherent equity power” ancillary to injunctive relief and that the 
SEC continued to request disgorgement even after 1990’s legislation explicitly authorized civil 
monetary penalties).  Such instances may well run contrary to conventional restitution doctrine due to 
legislative design.  Such a legislative creature may present a distinct type of disgorgement that is more 
akin to a penalty; where classic restitution remedies are neither penalties nor designed to be punitive. 
108. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 449; Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary 
Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 63 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul 
B. Miller eds., 2014). 
109. DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION § 4.3(5). (3d ed. 2018) (tracing the development of the common law accounting for profit 
to equity and also then the modern connection to unjust enrichment and development of a disgorgement 
remedy); see also Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 417, 482 (2017) [hereinafter Bray, Multiple Chancellors] (“A medieval Chancellor 
spoke on behalf of God and King; an early modern Chancellor spoke on behalf of conscience and 
King.”). 
110. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 58–63 (summarizing the history of the Chancery 
Court and its Chancellor, who began in the medieval sense as “high minister of the king,” turned novel 
writ maker, and ultimately turned judge of an equity court). 
111. See id. at 415–16 (“Regular officers of the Chancery Court, the masters, could serve as 
auditors and work through complex accounts if necessary and report to the court.  Chancery could use 
its powers of discovery to find hidden assets in the hands of defendant, and altogether the chancery 
accounting worked out pretty well.”). 
112. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 109, at 420 (explaining how the Chancellor’s 
authority is now dispersed to every judge that has the authority to issue equitable relief). 
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disgorgement may constitute a legal or equitable remedy depending on the 
circumstances.113  
Disgorgement operates in both public and private law contexts.114  A classic 
basis for wrongfulness is a fiduciary breach.  Wrongfulness may arise, however, 
from the presence of an enrichment that is unjust.115  Any benefit is unjust if the 
recipient has no right to retain it or in good conscience ought to pay value for 
it.116  In this way, restitution turns the focus away from plaintiff’s loss to 
defendant’s wrongful gain.117  Accordingly, restitution-based remedies often 
exceed compensation.118  Punishment, however, is not the aim of restitution: 
“The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing 
while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.”119  Instead, the 
aim is to undo defendant’s unjust enrichment.  Thus, where defendant unjustly 
profits, restitution remedies operate to strip the profit that is wrongful.  
Restitutionary remedies that achieve this goal are most commonly referred to 
 
113. See infra Section III.A.2.  For a useful discussion of the complexity of jury trial rights 
regarding accounting and disgorgement remedies, see generally Doug Rendleman, Commercial 
Bribery: Choice and Measurement Within a Remedies Smorgasbord, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 
(2017). 
114. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1059 (2015) (public: affirming $1.8 million 
disgorgement award for opportunistic breach of an interstate compact agreement over allocation of 
water rights); Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95 (Colo. App. 2011) (private: ruling 
proper a disgorgement of net profits award in real estate transaction case); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 
136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 678, 678 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (private: determining that plaintiff had stated a 
restitution claim for opportunistic breach of contract to disgorge benefits). 
115. Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 930 (2012) 
(“The law of restitution and unjust enrichment creates distinctive causes of action with many and 
diverse applications—to mistake, to joint owners and joint obligors, to unenforceable contracts, to 
disrupted transactions of all kinds.  And it creates distinctive remedies with applications to all sorts of 
causes of action—to claims in contract, tort, and unjust enrichment, and to claims for equitable wrongs 
and for violation of statutes.”). 
116. Unjust enrichment could be properly characterized as “unjustified enrichment”— 
“enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (grounding unjust enrichment law on legal, rather than 
moral, bounds); see also Laycock, supra note 115, at 932. 
117. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279 
(1989). 
118. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?  The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle 
in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341, 1392 (1985) (opposing a disgorgement of defendant’s 
gains for contract law based on the core purpose of contract law remedies to compensate plaintiff for 
loss). 
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4); see also 
DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at § 4.3(5). 
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as an accounting or disgorgement.120  In this context, disgorgement is a giving- 
up rather than a giving-back form of restitution, and plaintiff’s “at-the-expense-
of” loss is not required.121 
Disgorgement is technically not a proprietary remedy.122  A proprietary 
remedy yields a property right such as title to a particular asset.123  
Disgorgement of gains as a remedy does not, by itself, create a right to title in 
property.  It is often linked to an accounting for profits, which is also not 
propriety.124  Rather, disgorgement targets defendant’s monetary gains.  If the 
court orders a defendant to deliver financial books to discern profits and losses, 
the remedy appears to operate in personam—on defendant.125  If, instead, the 
court or jury awards a monetary remedy in an amount that equals defendant’s 
net gains, the remedy appears to operate in rem—on property.126 
Disgorgement may be confused with the proprietary remedy of constructive 
trust for unjust enrichment or fiduciary breach.  A constructive trust specifically 
operates in personam, but the effect is in rem in that the order once performed 
results in the transfer of title to property based on defendant’s unjust enrichment 
that began with plaintiff.  Each of these remedies relates to one another, but 
they are distinct in how they operate.  The constructive trust is equitable, 
requires tracing, and orders defendant to place the title of the trust property (the 
trust res) in the name of the true equitable owner, plaintiff.  An accounting for 
profits is also equitable127 and orders defendant to provide an account of profits 
to plaintiff.  Disgorgement awards plaintiff defendant’s wrongful gain. 
 
 
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (“Restitution 
remedies that pursue this object are often called ‘disgorgement’ or ‘accounting.’”).  See also DOBBS & 
ROBERTS, supra 109, at § 4.3(5) (discussing the same). 
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51. 
122. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 454. 
123. Id. at 455. 
124. See generally KATY BARNETT, ACCOUNTING FOR PROFIT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012) (interchanging an award of an account of profits with “disgorgement 
damages” and calling for adoption of equitable barriers to disgorgement awards for certain contractual 
breaches).  
125. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 397 (“Equity’s theory was that it did not decide title 
but acted in personam.  It did not act on title or property but upon the person of defendant, compelling 
him to follow good conscience rather than good title.”). 
126. Id. § 1.4 (explaining how money judgments “at law” are enforced “in rem, that is against 
things or property, not against persons”). 
127. Though the history is more complicated, an accounting is generally presumed equitable.  
Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); GEORGE E. PALMER, 1 THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION § 1.5(c) (1978); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES AND 
MATERIALS 440 (2018) (discussing mischaracterizations of an accounting for profit as legal and 
connection to application of statute of limitations versus laches considerations). 
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2. The Import of the Law-Equity Classification on Constitutional Rights and 
Defenses 
Simple classification of the disgorgement remedy as either equitable or 
legal is complex.  The law-equity distinction matters because it affects related 
rights.  Equity has distinct features that create a body of law,128 and equity also 
has its own defenses.129  For example, if disgorgement is categorized as a 
remedy at law, it triggers federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial.130  
If instead the remedy is deemed equitable, the determination of whether and 
how to calculate a disgorgement award rests solely with the judge.131  Further, 
as part of equitable discretion, the judge might deny an equitable remedy if a 
plaintiff comes to the court with unclean hands.  Federal legislation could 
extend a jury trial right even if disgorgement were truly equitable, but it cannot 
(without a constitutional amendment) strip a right to a jury if the constitutional 
right applies. 
Historically, the law-equity divide corresponded to the distinction between 
law’s goal of compensation and restitution’s sole focus on defendant’s 
wrongful gain:  
[T]he law estimates the damage done to the plaintiff by the 
defendant’s wrongful act and gives judgment for damages 
sufficient to compensate him.  Equity, on the other hand, does 
not concern itself with the damage done to the plaintiff: it 
concerns itself solely with the profits made by the defendant 
through his wrongdoing.  These it holds he cannot in 
conscience retain; and so it orders him to deliver them up to 
the plaintiff even when the plaintiff has suffered no actual 
damages through the wrong.  This is the principle upon which 
 
128. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 533 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bray, Equitable Remedies] (maintaining that equity constitutes its own system and one 
that is usefulness in modern law). 
129. Two common equitable defenses are unclean hands and laches.  The judge will use unclean 
hands to deny an equitable remedy where the movant engaged in misconduct directly related to the 
underlying case.  Laches serves to thwart an action for equitable relief where plaintiff slept on its rights 
by unreasonably delaying the litigation and prejudicing defendant.  Id. at 581. 
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”). 
131. Bray, Equitable Remedies, supra note 128, at 545. 
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the remedy by account is based.132 
Still, classification of disgorgement remains unresolved in American law.  
Further, litigant characterization is not dispositive.133  Misclassifications and 
myths regarding the general topic of unjust enrichment and restitution 
abound.134  Judicial and scholarly treatment of the disgorgement remedy is 
inconsistent.135  Most determinations favor an equitable framing, but recent 
Supreme Court interpretations favor legal classification without resolving 
constitutional jury trial rights.136  Courts have treated disgorgement as equitable 
in many contexts,137 but also as a remedy at law garnering a constitutional right 
to a jury.138  
 
132. J.A. STRAHAN, A DIGEST OF EQUITY 418–19 (5th ed. 1928) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
133. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476–79 (1962).  In Dairy Queen, plaintiff’s 
complaint alleged breach of a licensing agreement covering a trademark.  Id. at 473.  Plaintiff sought 
an injunction and an accounting of profits; plaintiff asserted the “purely equitable” nature of the 
remedies it sought.  Id. at 477.  The Court declined the invitation to allow plaintiff’s “choice of words 
used in the pleadings” to dictate proper classification: “the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot 
be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.”  Id. at 477–78.  Rather, the Court 
noted that “[a] jury, under proper instructions from the court, could readily determine the recovery, if 
any, to be had here, whether the theory finally settled upon is that of breach of contract, that of 
trademark infringement, or any combination of the two.”  Id. at 479.  It further reasoned that legal 
damages would not be inadequate simply because measuring such damages might require obtaining 
and examining defendant’s business records.  Id. 
134. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 127, 539–46.  
135. For confusing aspects of disgorgement, see Bert I. Huang, The Equipoise Effect, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1598 (2016) (“Our usual rhetoric hides [the equipoise effect of disgorgement] 
because the way we speak about disgorgement often conflates the remedy itself with the trappings of 
its usage, implicitly piling on extra nonremedial costs.”). 
136. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2001); 
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1986); George P. Roach, A Default 
Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 48 (2007). 
137. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (disgorgement as remedy for 
Nebraska’s opportunistic breach of the Republican River Compact); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 
438 F.3d 1052, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2006) (disgorgement as equitable remedy for FDCA violation); 
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Restitution for the disgorgement 
of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury.”); Castrol, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
at 344 (disgorgement as equitable under the Lanham Act); Am. Cyanamid, 649 F. Supp. at 789 (denying 
constitutional right to jury trial distinguishing disgorgement as equitable in nature and reasoning that 
“a claim for profits seeks relief recognized by the Seventh Amendment as fundamentally different from 
a claim for damages, the cases relied upon by American Cyanamid—involving claims for both 
damages and unjust profits—cannot be interpreted as blurring the two claims and rendering legal an 
otherwise purely equitable claim for profits”). 
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Disgorgement is another form 
of restitution, as Judge Friendly noted . . . , and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC cases, 
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Classification of disgorgement as legal instead of equitable is contested and 
important.  Resolution of the law-equity issue implicates constitutional jury trial 
rights as well as other meaningful issues such as the available defenses.  Though 
many courts view, if not assume, disgorgement as equitable, the United States 
Supreme Court has muddied the waters in two recent cases—both of which lean 
toward legal classification.  Could this be another “accidental revolution”139 for 
remedies law on the Court’s part? 
The first case does not consider the constitutional right to a jury trial.  
Rather, the case raised a statute of limitations question.  In Kokesh v. SEC, the 
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that disgorgement in the context of a 
securities-enforcement action is a legal “penalty” rather than an equitable 
remedy, and as such, would be subject to the five-year statute of limitations 
under the Securities Exchange Act.140  The Court expressed that the ruling was 
for the narrow question at issue.141  
A federal district court subsequently noted that the Kokesh ruling did not 
determine the law-equity classification as a matter of constitutional analysis but 
rather only as to the statute of limitations.142  After conducting historical 
analysis, the federal district court ruled that disgorgement is equitable and 
denied any constitutional right to a jury trial.143 
The law-equity distinction surrounding the disgorgement remedy also arose 
in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.,144 a case involving a design-patent 
 
is both a legal and an equitable remedy.”); Roach, supra note 136, at 48 (maintaining disgorgement 
may be either equitable or legal); cf. ROBERT M. LANGER, JOHN T. MORGAN, & DAVID L. BELT, 
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, BUSINESS TORTS, AND 
ANTITRUST § 6.9 (2019–2020 ed.) (noting disgorgement’s classification is complex).  For reasoning 
on the right to a jury trial for legal restitution generally, see First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 
S.W.3d 88, 92–94 (Ark. 2005). 
139. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental 
Revolution?  The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 203 (2012) (arguing that 
the Court’s modern injunction holdings caused an “accidental revolution”). 
140. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639, 1645 (2017) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2462).  
141. Id.  Notably, the Supreme Court leaves open the question of judicial power to order 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions: “Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion 
on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on 
whether courts have properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.  The sole question 
presented in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement actions, is subject 
to § 2462’s limitations period.”  Id. at 1642 n.3. 
142. United States v. Rapower–3, LLC, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1241–42 (D. Utah 2018). 
143. Id. at 1241 (denying right to jury trial on the basis of long-standing precedent categorizing 
disgorgement as equitable remedy incidental to injunctive relief). 
144. 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
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infringement claim under the Patent Act.145  The Solicitor General argued that 
a jury should determine the article of manufacture and the amount of any 
disgorged profits and that the defendant should bear the burden of proof.  This 
high-stakes litigation centered much attention on the remedies provision of the 
statute authorizing a disgorgement award for the design-patent infringer’s “total 
profit.”146  The Court analyzed whether to measure the disgorgement award 
based on Samsung’s profits for its smartphone devices as a whole versus only 
profits associated with individual components.147  The Supreme Court adopted 
a component-level interpretation advanced by the infringer Samsung because 
components are “articles of manufacture” (even if not sold separately to 
consumers), but that the whole device is also an “article of manufacture.”148  
Citing the lack of “adequate briefing by the parties,”149 the Court failed to 
resolve the proper measure for a judge or a jury to use.  Instead, the Court left 
the issue for resolution by the Federal Circuit.  Patent law scholars have raised 
concerns over the Supreme Court’s holding and the merits of the Solicitor 
General’s contentions regarding the classification of the remedy as legal.150  
Other patent law scholars wholly objected to the application of an all-profits-
disgorgement remedy as absurd and draconian.151 
If common-law based cause of action seeks a disgorgement remedy, then 
the law-equity classification of disgorgement is an open question in some 
circumstances and clearer in others.  For example, if the underlying claim is for 
breach of fiduciary duty, the claim is equitable and often the remedies sought 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 431 (examining 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012)).  
147. Id.  A cell phone screen is an example of a component. 
148. Id. at 436 (“[T]he term ‘article of manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product 
sold to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or not.  Thus, reading 
‘article of manufacture’ in § 289 to cover only an end product sold to a consumer gives too narrow a 
meaning to the phrase.”). 
149. Id. (“We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry in the 
absence of adequate briefing by the parties.”). 
150. See Pamela Samuelson & Mark Gergen, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design Patent Law, 
108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (exploring the proper scope of the disgorgement remedy in 
design patent law).  A historical survey of pre-statute claims for infringers’ profits, including patent 
and copyright claims, would likely reveal a mixture of approaches including some courts treating the 
remedy as legal.  Such results, if demonstrated, would complicate efforts to convince the Supreme 
Court to deem the modern remedy equitable as a matter of constitutional interpretation unless the Court 
shifts its test for resolving the law-equity issue away from the historical focus.  
151. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petition for 
Certiorari at 2, 9, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777).  Others also 
opposed an all-profit disgorgement award and noted such negatives as the major ramifications on the 
patent industry.  Brief of Systems, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Samsung Elecs. 
Co., 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777). 
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are identifiably equitable such as a constructive trust or an injunction.  But, 
however, what if the cause of action is legal but the remedy is equitable? 
Confusion abounds because some courts in fiduciary breach cases claim to 
award “damages” or abandon the equitable accounting of profits frame for the 
term disgorgement.152  If, instead, the claim is opportunistic breach of contract 
seeking disgorgement, the issue is an open question.153  Recall that restitution 
remedies can be equitable (constructive trust) or legal (quantum meruit or 
quantum valebant).154  Courts have granted constitutional jury trial rights in 
cases seeking restitution-based remedies under the frames of quasi-contract, 
legal restitution, and freestanding unjust enrichment for quantum meruit or 
quantum valebant.155  Further, when analyzing the Seventh Amendment 
constitutional right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has conducted separate 
analysis of both the claim and the remedy sought with modern jurisprudence 
focusing on the history rather than the function of the remedy.156  If one party 
requests a jury trial, and the other opposes it, the court would likely focus on 
historical analysis of the claim and the remedy to make the determination.157  If, 
as this Article suggests, Congress passes legislation authorizing litigation and 
providing for disgorgement relief, Congress would be free to extend a right to 
a jury trial regardless of classification because the constitutional right is a floor 
rather than a ceiling.  It is more likely that Congress would be silent,158 which 
would leave the jury trial question to the courts.  
 
152. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, supra note 106, at 465. 
153. For indications of the complexity, a draft version of the Restatement noted that it would be 
a serious mistake to treat the new disgorgement for opportunistic breach section as equitable. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 7, 2010).  The final version of the Restatement, however, is silent on the proper 
classification.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 4 cmt. e.  
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4. 
155. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2002) (restitution as both a legal 
and equitable remedy); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (restitution 
of disgorgement of unjust enrichment as equitable remedy); First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 
S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ark. 2005) (unjust enrichment after alleged breach of implied contract as equitable 
cause of action). 
156. Samuel L. Bray, Equity and the Seventh Amendment (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 
1852, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237907 [https://perma.cc/H9V6-PFKA]. 
157. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 351–53 (1998) 
(analyzing whether the claim and the remedy were historically treated as legal or equitable); Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376–84 (1996) (analyzing whether patent claim 
construction was historically a matter for the judge or jury). 
158. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(“A plain reading of the Lanham Act remedy section unqualifiedly weighs against Pennzoil’s 
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An equitable frame would be best because judges rather than juries could 
shape the relief while balancing the delicate interests at stake in suits leveled 
against sitting government officials.  For example, constitutional or federal 
statute violations may lead to equitable relief along with ancillary remedies 
against government officials despite claims of sovereign immunity.159  
Equitable relief is prospective and, if in the form of disgorgement rather than 
injunctive relief, is less disruptive to delicate separation-of-powers and 
federalism balances.  Such suits are grounded on civil rights legislation that 
expressly authorizes suing state government actors.160  The Emoluments 
lawsuits generally rest on a theory of the Executive’s official conduct violating 
the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution.  These lawsuits are not based on 
civil rights violations, so the traditional, express pathway to federal court 
litigation is lacking.161  Advocates of the Emoluments litigation maintain that 
an implied right of action exists, but this point is vigorously contested.162  
Explicit statutory authorization, as proposed below, would alleviate much of 
this tension.  
 
interpretation that they are entitled to a jury trial on the disgorgement of profits issue. . . .  Furthermore, 
the language of this section makes no mention of a trial by jury.”). 
159. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1978) (attorney fees); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 162–63 (1908) (injunctive relief). 
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
161. See Josh Blackman & Seth Tillman, The Emoluments Clauses Litigation, Part 8: There is 
No Cause of Action for a Suit Against the President in his Individual Capacity for Purported Violations 
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B. Disgorgement as the Proper Remedy for Emoluments Violations 
If a federal officer receives an emolument that is unconstitutional, it is by 
definition an unjust benefit.  Disgorgement is particularly suited to remedy that 
wrong.163  It centers on defendant’s wrongful gain rather than plaintiff’s loss.  
Ideally, disgorgement harmonizes the imbalance of gain by depriving the 
wrongdoer of profits to the point of lawfulness.  However, if the gains are given 
to one who should have been entitled to make them, then the court restores a 
just equilibrium.164 
But, who should have the right to remedy this wrong?  Should the remedy 
be attainable by private plaintiffs or the government treasury itself?  An analogy 
to the cy près doctrine—allowing the judge to discern as near as possible in 
whom the remedy should lie—from charitable trust law might be a helpful path 
for determining a worthy recipient.165  Depending upon the category of 
emoluments, not all of the potential plaintiffs in the pending cases have a right 
to make the profits.  A competing hotel may have that right and thus rerouting 
the gain to such plaintiffs attains proper equilibrium between wrongdoer and 
victim.  If the theory of litigation is on behalf of the government or the people, 
placing the gain in the government’s hands is more of a distributive choice than 
a rebalancing or a restoration.  It would not be a restoration because the gain 
does not constitute money previously belonging to, or expected to be gained 
by, the plaintiff.  Again, though disgorgement serves to force defendant to give 
up wrongful gain, it does not require that the money first resided in the 
plaintiff’s possession or potential possession.166  But power to recover such 
gains and deter corruption should lie in the government because the gain is 
achieved by virtue of the official’s government position.167 
 
163. If a court authorizes a disgorgement remedy, it may be necessary to reach the government 
officer’s personal account where such assets may lie.  For an argument that any disgorgement or 
constructive trust remedy in the emolument context necessitates suing the President in his personal 
rather than official capacity, see Motion for Leave to File Brief of Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman and 
Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party with Respect to Motion to 
Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant in His Individual Capacity at 14–15, District of Columbia v. Trump, 
291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM). 
164. As discussed below, infra note 208 and accompanying text, Aristotle would be pleased with 
this use of restitution to restore justice. 
165. I.R.S., The Cy Pres Doctrine: State Law and the Dissolution of Charities (1981), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopice81.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CXK-DDX6]. 
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
167. I.R.S., supra note 165; see Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1955) (endorsing 
city’s implied power to sue for restitution to recover money that officials allegedly extorted from city 
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The Supreme Court recently endorsed a disgorgement remedy for 
opportunistic breach of contract in an interstate water-compact case.168  Though 
the setting is distinct, the underlying logic is relevant in the potential use of a 
disgorgement remedy against a federal officer.  The Court noted: “And 
whatever is true of a private contract action, the case for disgorgement becomes 
still stronger when one State gambles with another State’s rights to a scarce 
natural resource.”169  Endorsing the remedy of disgorgement, the Court sought 
to serve at least two goals: stability and deterrence.170  The stability interest 
included the law of contracts as well as the allocation of water resources under 
such compacts.171 
Emoluments raise a strong deterrence interest as well as a desire for 
stability.  Addressing an emoluments violation is not as simple as remedying a 
breach of contract.  But if an emolument is deemed unlawful, it is a breach of 
trust.  If foreign governments are attempting to curry favor, disgorgement 
would restabilize proper relations and demonstrate the wrongfulness of the 
attempt.  
The fact that disgorgement often exceeds compensation is more 
troublesome in private breach of contracts settings where compensation is the 
conventional remedy and goal.  Surpassing compensation is more familiar and 
palatable where there is a high desire to prevent the unjust enrichment, 
especially when coupled with a possible breach of other duties.172 
Some scholars claim that disgorgement punishes.  If calibrated properly to 
the profit wrongfully obtained,173 disgorgement simply undoes that improper 
 
employees and relying on a House of Lords example focusing not on the government’s loss but instead 
on the wrongdoer’s gain by misuse of its position). 
168. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015). 
169. Id. at 1057. 
170. Id. (“[T]his Court may order disgorgement of gains, if needed to stabilize a compact and 
deter future breaches, when a State has demonstrated reckless disregard of another, more vulnerable 
State’s rights under that instrument.”). 
171. Id. 
172. See infra Section III.A. 
173. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 
507 (1980).  The Court authorized a constructive trust remedy over ex-Central Intelligence Agent’s 
wrongful profits earned from a book published without prepublication clearance, though not containing 
classified information.  Id. at 511, 515.  The Court viewed the behavior as a fiduciary breach warranting 
the imposition of a constructive trust over his book publication royalties.  Id. at 515.  Scholars, myself 
included, have criticized the reasoning in Snepp.  See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 
68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1419 n.25 (2016); Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts 
of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1034 n.34 (2011).  Snepp violated his contractual duty but 
did not breach his fiduciary duty because he did not publish classified information.  Snepp, 444 U.S. 
509–10.  It is also less than clear that defendant profited from property belonging to the government.  
See id. at 508–09.  Further, the Court did not analyze how to trace the wrongful profits versus the 
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gain.  It does not also then treble or otherwise multiply the award to punish 
defendant.174  It only strips away the gain that would be unjust to retain. 
Disgorgement does take gain that defendant had no right to make.  This serves 
to deter and prevent unjust enrichment and conscious advantage-taking. 
Does service of a deterrence function automatically convert the remedy to 
a punitive one?  If crafted to vindicate a public interest and punish a wrongdoer, 
then definitely yes.  Is it possible, however, to exceed compensation in order to 
deter but not punish a defendant who consciously takes without asking?  That 
is the goal of restitution.  
 
profits Snepp had every right to make.  See id. at 507, 515–16.  If, for example, Snepp had to surrender 
all royalties from his book, the remedy neither calibrates to which parts of the book were as a result of 
classified information nor which parts Snepp earned through his own untainted merit.  If one 
reimagines the wrong as an opportunistic breach of contract where the breach is failure to ask 
permission in advance, a disgorgement of all profits thus wrongfully made may be warranted.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39, cmt. d, illus. 4 & Reporter’s 
Note d (AM. LAW. INST. 2011).  A complete strip of profits (or imposition of a constructive trust over 
all of profits earned), however, runs the risk of overreaching if the real intent is to punish bluntly.  The 
lower court suggested punitive damages would have been a preferable route.  Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.  
The comparable, famous case of the Commonwealth, Attorney Gen.  v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (H.L.) 
(Eng.), fares a bit better due to tighter reasoning, though Blake is not without its critics.  See, e.g., 
JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 149 (2002); Mitchell McInnes, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: The Search for a 
Principled Relationship, in UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 225, 241 (E.J.H. 
Schrage ed., 2001); Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in 
Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 115, 117, n.7 (2000); Robert Stevens, Damages 
and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW (Jason W. 
Neyers, Richard Bronaugh, & Stephen G.A. Pitel eds., 2009) (maintaining that Blake invented the 
disgorgement remedy though lacking precedent); see also John D. McCamus, Disgorgement for 
Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 943 (2003). 
174. Congress could draft legislation with additional remedial functions to address punitive 
goals.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (providing for recovery of “threefold the damages” sustained 
and costs).  If labeled punitive, however, other consequences may arise such as tax implications. 
DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 109, at 324 n.449 (explaining the taxable nature of punitive versus 
compensatory awards). 
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Economic theory175 poses a counterargument that a disgorgement remedy 
may exceed the goal of optimal deterrence.176  The theory of deterrence asks: 
what is the least quotient of remedy that can achieve deterrence?177  To go 
beyond that amount would be overkill.  Thus, if compensation will do, then 
disgorgement might be excessive in achieving a partial deterrence goal.  An 
optimal deterrence theory might dictate that the cost of deterrence not exceed 
the cost of the action being deterred.  These points are worth considering, 
though disgorgement should be able to overcome the challenge for at least some 
of the possible emolument violations.  
Disgorgement should be available, if not preferred, for three reasons.  First, 
a lesser remedy such as compensation may be unattainable and undesirable 
given that emoluments violations most often do not cause commensurate loss 
to putative plaintiffs.  The exception would be competitor hotels; however, 
those losses may suffer from proof problems such as causation.178  Second, 
restitution-based remedies such as disgorgement should not punish if applied 
properly to the offensive behavior and measured correctly.  It is true that proper 
application and measurement will require finesse, but it is worth pursuing.  
Appropriately attained disgorgement would not punish and ideally would not 
over-deter.  The reply to that assertion is that disgorgement achieves complete 
deterrence because it strips all gain.179  To a law-and-economics advocate 
 
175. Consideration of this counterargument is part of this Article’s effort to increase dialogue 
between remedies scholars and law and economic theorists, as there is much insight to be gained even 
if the two groups at times operate with distinct value choices in mind.  For a thoughtful treatment on 
why this dialogue is important, see Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet 
Remedies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2018) (noting the startling lack of conversation, detailing 
the dangers of misconceptions, and suggesting deeper collaboration between the two fields).   
176. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 160–63 (1987); cf. Huang, supra note 135, at 1599–601 (noting that disgorging net gain does not 
force defendant to suffer a loss, permitting defendant to break even).  Professor Huang argues that 
using disgorgement as a remedy some of the time may emulate the incentives of applying other 
compensatory remedies all of the time.  Id. at 1599, 1605.  He posits that this flexibility may be helpful 
when harm is difficult to measure.  Id. at 1599–601, 1621–24.  In contractual cases, the expectation 
remedy may lead to over-reliance by the nonbreaching party; whereas, disgorgement may cause the 
breaching party to over-rely.  Yehonatan Givati & Yotam Kaplan, Over-Reliance Under Contractual 
Disgorgement, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 82 (2018). 
177. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
79 (1982); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 1143 (1989).  But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want 
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) (offering two studies to demonstrate that people 
do not believe in optimal deterrence).   
178. See supra Section II.C.1. 
179. Complete deterrence’s purpose is to ensure defendant never chooses the wrongful behavior.  
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 
421 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and 
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complete deterrence is not preferable to optimal, partial deterrence.  It simply 
goes farther than necessary to achieve the desired goal of deterrence.  If 
calibrated correctly, it is possible not to strip all gain, though in practice 
achieving this goal may be difficult.  To attempt the achievement, the factfinder 
would need to discern which part of the gain is unjust.  Did defendant contribute 
lawfully to the creation of profit in such a way that justifies retention of some 
part of the enrichment?  Third, for some disgorgement may be preferable 
because optimal deterrence is not as important as preventing the unjust 
enrichment or eliminating corruption, especially where the enrichment occurs 
from conscious-advantage taking without asking or in reckless disregard of the 
interests of others or a paramount public interest.  This feature is especially true 
where an injunction would have been warranted ex ante, but it becomes too late 
to achieve it.  For example, the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s requirement of 
congressional consent is a constitutionally mandated permission lever, but it 
may be too late to stop the objectionable conduct.  Accordingly, if one took 
without asking, disgorgement would be the proper remedy.  
Ample precedent exists for using disgorgement as a powerful remedy for 
federal statutory violations.180  It is true that disgorgement is not always deemed 
an option for violation of certain federal laws.  For example, disgorgement is 
no longer available as a remedy for utility patent infringement due to the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of statutory amendments regarding the law-
equity divide.181  For emoluments, Congress ideally would authorize 
disgorgement, identify proper plaintiffs, and clarify the law-equity distinction 
for the purposes of jury trial rights and applicable defenses.  Even in the absence 
of any statutory authorization, disgorgement of unjust enrichment is a viable 
emoluments remedy under the common law. 
 
Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 486, 489 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) 
(“The primary goal of gain elimination is the complete deterrence of socially unproductive 
activities . . . .”). 
180. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1946) (disgorging profits 
gained from federal statutory violation). 
181. Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent 
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 665–89 (2010) (criticizing the Court’s determination that 
disgorgement is not an available remedy under the revised statute). 
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C. Unjust Enrichment and Emoluments 
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment sets forth 
the basic liability for unjust enrichment in the first section: “A person who is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in 
restitution.”182  The phrase “at the expense of another,” does not require a loss 
by plaintiff, but instead means “‘in violation of the other’s legally protected 
rights,’ without the need to show that the claimant has suffered a loss.”183  This 
feature of unjust enrichment renders a claim that should not fail even though 
plaintiff cannot allege loss.184 
A critical feature of unjust enrichment and disgorgement in particular is 
that they are not designed to compensate plaintiff.  Though recovery may 
exceed compensation, the purpose is not to punish.  Instead, restitution 
remedies like disgorgement are meant to strip defendant’s unjust enrichment 
and deter conscious advantage-taking.  
Two specific sections of the Restatement have particular relevance with 
respect to possible emoluments.  The first involves fiduciary or confidential 
relations.185  Another covers interference with other protected interests.186  
 
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
183. Id. § 1, cmt. a. 
184. Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339). 
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43: 
A person who obtains a benefit 
(a) in breach of a fiduciary duty, 
(b) in breach of an equivalent duty imposed by a relation of trust and 
confidence, or 
(c) in consequence of another’s breach of such a duty,  
is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed. 
186. Id. § 44: 
(1) A person who obtains a benefit by conscious interference with a claimant’s 
legally protected interests (or in consequence of such interference by another) is 
liable in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, unless competing 
legal objectives make such liability inappropriate.  
(2) For purposes of subsection (1), interference with legally protected interests 
includes conduct that is tortious, or that violates another legal duty or prohibition 
(other than a duty imposed by contract), if the conduct constitutes an actionable 
wrong to the claimant.  
(3) Restitution by the rule of this section will be limited or denied  
(a) if the court would refuse to enjoin the interference, assuming timely 
application and an absence of procedural or administrative obstacles;  
(b) to the extent it would result in an inappropriate windfall to the claimant, 
or would otherwise be inequitable in a particular case;  
(c) if the benefit derived from the interference cannot be adequately measured; 
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Under a fiduciary theory, additional support may exist in the Constitution’s 
Take Care Clause: “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”187  Other scholars have articulated this as a substantive 
theory.188  Disgorgement is also suggested as one of the possible remedies.189 
To the extent a contractual relationship exists in the first instance between 
a plaintiff and the government official in question, then it is also worth 
considering whether there is an opportunistic breach of contract that warrants 
disgorgement of profits.190  For example, the American Law Institute suggests 
reconceptualizing Snepp191 as an opportunistic breach of contract to disgorge 
wrongful gains,192 access to the remedy reframed as disgorgement thus requires 
an opportunistic breach of contract.  An opportunistic breach theory against any 
government official depends on the wording of relevant contracts with a focus 
on any clauses on exclusivity or covenants regarding loyalty and 
confidentiality. 
IV.  REMEDYING EMOLUMENTS VIOLATIONS 
A. Whistleblower Legislation 
1. Congress’s Power to Legislate Against Emoluments 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause does not expressly grant authority to 
Congress to regulate against emoluments.193  Congress possesses the power, 
 
or  
(d) if allowance of the claim would conflict with liabilities or penalties for the 
interference provided by other law. 
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
188. See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 106, at 485 (advancing a theory of fiduciary 
constitutionalism). 
189. Id. at 487 (“Public fiduciary duties, then, can have straightforward (and literal) juridical 
applications with fairly conventional remedies one would see in the private law: constructive trusts, 
accounting, injunctions, and damages with a view to disgorgement.”).  The listed remedies are 
prevalent in public and private litigation.  A minor clarification: disgorgement as this Article proposes 
it would be linked to restitution and unjust enrichment and therefore would not constitute a type of 
damages, neither compensatory nor punitive damages. 
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39. 
191. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see also supra note 173 (analyzing Snepp and 
listing sources critical of its reasoning). 
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, cmt. d, illus. 4 
& reporter’s note d; see also Nicholas W. Sage, Disgorgement: From Property to Contract, 66 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 244, 259 (2016) (analogizing to breach of negative covenant cases). 
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
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however, as a matter of implication via the constitutional phrase “without the 
Consent of the Congress.”194  The invocation of congressional consent suggests 
Congress prospectively could regulate law within its consent power.  This 
dynamic is comparable to congressional assent to state compacts.195 
By analogy to compact power,196 Congress possesses the power to legislate 
regarding emoluments violations and proper remedies.  With respect to 
compacts, Congress can pass legislation incident to its compact power.  A 
variety of cases explore the parameters of the compact power.197  The power to 
legislate is broad, though the remedial provisions may abuse that power if, for 
example, the encroachment on state sovereignty is excessive.198  For 
emoluments legislation, this limitation is not a concern because the exercise of 
power would be on the federal level.  Boundaries, if any, would arise by virtue 
of separation-of-powers concerns rather than federalism constraints.  Because 
the Constitution gives Congress explicit power to consent to emoluments, 
 
194. Id.  Litigation over a presidential attempt to block congressional oversight subpoenas sheds 
light on the breadth of Congress’s powers in this arena:  
Courts have grappled for more than a century with the question of the scope of 
Congress’s investigative power.  The binding principle that emerges from these 
judicial decisions is that courts must presume Congress is acting in furtherance of its 
constitutional responsibility to legislate and must defer to congressional judgments 
about what Congress needs to carry out that purpose.  To be sure, there are limits on 
Congress’s investigative authority.  But those limits do not substantially constrain 
Congress.  So long as Congress investigates on a subject matter on which ‘legislation 
could be had,’ Congress acts as contemplated by Article I of the Constitution.   
Applying those principles here compels the conclusion that President Trump 
cannot block the subpoena. . . .  According to the Oversight Committee, it believes 
that the requested records will aid its consideration of strengthening ethics and 
disclosure laws, as well as amending the penalties for violating such laws.  The 
Committee also says that the records will assist in monitoring the President’s 
compliance with the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  These are facially valid legislative 
purposes . . . .  Accordingly, the court will enter judgment in favor of the Oversight 
Committee. 
Trump v. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 380 F. Supp. 3d 76, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2019). 
195. An example of state compacts requiring congressional approval is interstate water-rights 
compacts.  See, e.g., The Republican River Compact. Pub. L. No. 78-60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943). 
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.  (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).  
197. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (interstate water-rights 
compact); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (tribe and state compact on gaming 
activities); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151–52 (1992) (regional waste compact). 
198. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186–88 (severing unconstitutional legislative 
incentive essentially mandating state action in specific ways). 
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Congress should possess the power to regulate emoluments.  Indeed, Congress 
has already passed legislation under an implied emoluments power.199 
It may be preferable that Congress rather than private litigants sets the 
policies and boundaries of emoluments.  Congress could consider which 
individuals or entities should garner a right to sue, but it may determine the core 
of the interest is the government itself.  Yet the government likely needs to 
uncover hidden information to assess possible violations.  Whistleblowers, in 
the form of government officials or private confidants, may strike an ideal 
balance.  They possess inside information and a statute could provide the 
government incentive to obtain information it might not otherwise obtain.  The 
information gathering and sharing incentive also aids political remedies of 
citizens who cannot sue because they raise only generalized grievances; they 
do have a right to vote out an elected government official but cannot effectively 
do so without greater accountability.  A whistleblower statute would aid 
accountability by bringing concealed information into the public arena. 
Regardless of whom Congress may determine is the preferred litigant to 
right such wrongs, disgorgement is the best path to protect any such right.  To 
best protect the right, Congress is best suited to determine materiality thresholds 
and the contours of emoluments strike the public trust and fidelity of 
government.  Once those boundaries are set, Congress also should consider the 
remedies best designed to undo and deter the precise harms. 
Several avenues exist to provide relief for constitutional emoluments 
violations.  Congress could use its power to establish a private right of action.200  
It could further provide a catalogue of preferred remedies and the goals to be 
served.  Alternatively, Congress could designate, but limit, remedies to the 
federal government.201  Without legislative action or guidance, lawyers would 
 
199. For example, in 1966, Congress authorized in the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act a 
general statutory consent to the acceptance of specific minimal gifts and other tangible gifts and 
decorations.  Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-673, 80 Stat. 952 (1966).  
Congress later clarified exceptions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.  Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, P.L. 95-105, 91 Stat. 862 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7342 
(2011)).  Prior to 1966, Congress often passed legislation explicitly approving a foreign gift or 
decoration.  See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43660, THE RECEIPT OF GIFTS BY 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 7 (2014) (citing CLARENCE CANNON, 7 CANNON’S 
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1889 (1935); S. REP. NO. 89-1160 (1966); 
CONSTITUTION – JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 145; 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2052 (1966)). 
200. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
201. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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be wise to consider incorporating into their complaints a common law unjust 
enrichment claim for a restitutionary disgorgement remedy.202   
2. Legislating an Emoluments Disgorgement Remedy 
If the government were to craft such emoluments legislation, it should 
include a restitutionary disgorgement remedy.  This scheme would prevent 
unjust enrichment and deter corruption.  If Congress were to regulate in this 
arena, it should consider private rights of action and whistleblower options.  
Creating particularized liability would alleviate the temptation for generalized 
grievance litigation.  Congress should also use the opportunity to legislate the 
preferred remedy that would best serve the interests at stake and deter 
potentially egregious behavior. 
At minimum, Congress could pass legislation that creates a private right to 
sue for aggrieved persons.  For example, Washington D.C. hotel owners who 
lost typical customers who opted to stay at the President’s hotel instead.  Private 
law will shape public law.  A congressional statute gives a political branch the 
opportunity to help shape the boundaries.  Congress need not go the full 
distance of the constitutional grant, but it could weigh in regarding desired 
bounds.  It could draw the line between speculative claims of prospective 
customers and claims exhibiting a reasonable likelihood of such customers but 
for the Executive’s competing property.  Regarding the remedy, Congress could 
utilize other methods of damages than disgorgement such as actual damages or 
statutory damages, but disgorgement would best serve the goals of undoing and 
deterring unjust enrichment.  Actual damages would be difficult to prove, but 
if proven would serve a pure compensation function.  Statutory damages would 
eliminate the proof problem but likely attempt to approximate plaintiff’s loss 
rather than defendant’s wrongful gains.  
An alternative proposed legislation scheme could model the False Claims 
Act,203 which authorizes qui tam suits brought by a whistleblower on behalf of 
the government.204  The False Claims Act gives the government an option to 
enter the litigation or simply await partial recovery upon a whistleblower’s 
successful suit.205  Congress could create a similar scheme for those that come 
forward with particular information of unlawful conduct by a federal 
government officer.  The statute would define the parameters of eligible 
 
202. See infra Section IV.B. 
203. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
204. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1152 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(explaining “‘qui tam’ is taken from the Latin expression qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso 
in hac parte sequitur, meaning ‘who brings the action for the king as well as for himself’”); see also 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1768). 
205. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–30 (2012). 
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whistleblowers and the percentage of recovery, but such a suit would be on 
behalf of the government.  This method may be preferable because it protects 
the public interest and, by disgorging wrongful profits, it shifts those gains to 
the government and deters future unjust gains.  The whistleblower would 
receive some portion as an incentive to serve as a private attorney general.  
In the past, the White House has sought governmental advice in compliance 
with governmental ethics regulations.  The Office of Government Ethics, 
however, does not cover and cannot enforce emoluments without congressional 
authorization.206  Congress could create a role for the Office of Government 
Ethics207 or determine that other entities are better suited to carry forward 
governmental aims of anti-corruption, anti-self-dealing, accountability, and 
fidelity to the country and the office. 
A possible criticism of the proposed legislative-remedial path is that 
restitution should not be used to give a plaintiff (the government or the 
whistleblower) something to which they had no preexisting or future right to 
have.  It is not the government’s profit to make.  These are profits no 
government officer or entity should make.  So, unlike the False Claims Act, 
which in essence returns defrauded monies to the government, disgorgement of 
emoluments may give to the government money it never had and never would 
have had.  An emoluments restitutionary recovery would rarely if ever 
constitute a windfall given the rarity of such violations and the relative amount 
of money compared to the overall federal budget. 
If, however, we view the unlawful behavior as a breach of fiduciary trust 
or parallel to an opportunistic breach of contract, then disgorgement still merits 
serious consideration.  Modern restitution law has evolved from simple 
restoration of property to the undoing of any enrichment one lacks justification 
to retain.  Aristotle advocated that such imbalances to society’s just equilibrium 
cannot be sustained.208  The restitution remedy of disgorgement ensures that a 
 
206. The mission of the Office (OGE) is to “[p]rovide overall leadership and oversight of the 
executive branch ethics program designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest,” but it does “not 
handle complaints of misconduct, nor does OGE have investigative or prosecutorial authority.  OGE’s 
mission is one of prevention.”  Mission and Responsibilities, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF GOV’T 
ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities 
[https://perma.cc/4LYD-SP2E] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
207. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON RULE 
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 6 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
08/Report_TaskForceReport_2018_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/E42D-AZPR]. 
208. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 86–88 (David Ross trans., Oxford University 
Press 2009); cf. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (applying Aristotelean theory to show how the restitution interest provides 
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wrongdoer is unable to retain profits that are kept without legal justification or 
otherwise violative. 
Another point of consideration is whether Congress or the courts should 
resolve which profits are traceable to the violation.  Should a government 
officer be able to keep any profits made?  As a matter of policy, Congress would 
be wise to determine if the emoluments prohibitions should constitute a flat ban 
in which case all profits constituting wrongful emoluments would be 
recoverable.  Still there may be issues if blended profits exist, and Congress 
could determine which party bears the burden of either proving causation versus 
warranting an offset for efforts to make any lawful portion of the gains.  
Disgorgement of profits for certain intellectual property violations would offer 
insights into statutory issues Congress should consider and perhaps resolve.209  
 
B. Failsafe of Unjust Enrichment as a Common Law Claim 
Without congressional legislation, unjust enrichment law can provide 
avenues to recovery.  As a matter of best practices, congressional involvement 
would be beneficial to help set the policy parameters of unconstitutional 
emoluments.  If Congress is unable to accomplish this goal, private and public 
litigants would be wise to study the common law of unjust enrichment and 
restitution.  As outlined in this Article,210 the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment provides many avenues to address wrongdoing that 
often may fall between the cracks of other bodies of law.  
Unjust enrichment can serve as the basis of a freestanding cause of action 
or its theory can provide the foundation for restitutionary remedies that attach 
to other substantive bodies of law such as breaches of fiduciary duties.  As a 
freestanding matter, one has no right to retain benefits without legal 
justification or in violation of any other legal duty.  Private corners of the law 
may provide helpful resolutions to breaches of gray or overlapping areas of the 
law that existing remedies either fall to capture or address inadequately for 
protection of the rights and their attendant goals.  Regardless of the path, the 
 
greater justification for relief, but doing so in a binary relationship setting where “A not only causes B 
to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not 
one unit but two.”).  Modern restitution law does not require that B lose something that A gains; rather, 
it is enough that B has gained something B has no right to retain and thus should disgorge.  I argue that 
it is more important to see the basis for the disgorgement remedy, then determine whether B is the 
proper plaintiff under the instant conception of an unjust enrichment theory for disgorging unlawful 
emoluments. 
209. See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text (discussing difficult issues in unclear 
boundaries to disgorgement in design-patent legislation and litigation). 
210. See supra Section III.C (outlining possible relevant sections of the Restatement to 
emolument concerns). 
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restitutionary remedy of disgorgement of wrongful gains is a remedy that would 
undo the unjust enrichment, prevent opportunism and corruption, and deter 
future temptations for accepting and hiding questionable emoluments.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Whatever the precise parameters of unlawful emoluments, proof may show 
that certain emoluments represent benefits unjustly derived from a person’s 
service to the public.  If so, their receipt should be deterred.  If received by a 
covered government actor, emoluments constitute unjust enrichment and are 
violative of the Constitution.  A powerful remedy should lie.  The ideal remedy 
to rectify the harm is disgorgement of improper gains.  This Article articulates 
why disgorgement will best serve desired goals such as anti-corruption and anti-
self-dealing.  Pending emoluments lawsuits continue to face constitutional 
hurdles and may not be the best route to shaping the contours of the right and 
ensuring application of ideal remedies that serve the underlying goals.  This 
Article proposes legislation to ensure a clear path to the restitutionary remedy 
of disgorgement when violations of the Emoluments Clauses arise. 
 
